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Abstract 
 
Since Pakistan’s inception, Gilgit-Baltistan, a sprawling region in Northern Pakistan, has 
not been granted provincial status due to its colonial association with the disputed region of 
Kashmir. Gilgit-Baltistan refutes its forceful integration with Kashmir, an unfortunate remnant of 
British divide-and-rule strategy, and demands provincial recognition and constitutional rights. 
Pakistan unfairly claims that it awaits the UN-sanctioned plebiscite in Kashmir to determine the 
region’s status. However, the likelihood of a plebiscite is little to none, since the Indian 
government officially annexed Indian-held Kashmir in August 2019, breaching the UN 
resolution on the plebiscite. A region that has been at the mercy of draconian empires for 
centuries, is now exploited by an independent country it fought to join. Numerous self-
empowerment reforms have created a façade of devolution, while the federal government holds 
direct control over the region’s activities. China holds unconstrained access to the region, 
without the permission of the local government. State-sponsored sectarian violence undermines 
unity and stability. The people protest the region’s ambiguous status that disenfranchises its tax-
paying and law-abiding population. 
In this senior honors thesis, I argue that the government of Pakistan intends to concretize 
Gilgit-Baltistan’s liminal status. Employing an urban definition of liminal space, I describe 
Gilgit-Baltistan’s history of uncertainty and disillusionment, in the context of its regional 
neighbors claiming parts of it. I emphasize that boundary-making politics of South Asia and 
Pakistan’s absolute control over its deprived population maintain the territorial and political 
ambiguity of the region. It is to be seen if Gilgit-Baltistan initiates a nation-wide revolt against 
the colonial-like rule of Pakistan and has its valid demands for long-awaited recognition met. 
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Preface and Acknowledgments 
 
In early August 2019, after India’s unexpected annexation of semi-autonomous Indian-
held Kashmir, I abandoned my research on the socio-economic impacts of the Chinese-Pakistan 
Economic Corridor and started taking a serious interest in Kashmir’s developing political status. 
As a citizen of Pakistan, I was quite embarrassed to realize that my knowledge on Kashmir was 
fueled by nationalistic rhetoric I was fed in school and home and not rooted in unbiased facts. 
With the help of the faculty and the Trinity College Library’s surprising plethora of sources on 
my chosen topic, I was able to interview the Gilgit-Baltistan diaspora community and learn the 
decades-long state-sponsored oppression of my fellow countrymen. Nevertheless, although 
critical of the government of Pakistan; Through writing this thesis, I aim to present the political, 
economic, and social instability of the region consigned to oblivion. This thesis is an attempt to 
amplify unheard voices and highlight overlooked and under-researched intentions of the central 
government.  
This thesis would have not been possible without the support and advice of the Trinity 
community and others. Dr. Garth Myers, my first-year advisor and academic advisor for the past 
four years, has encouraged, motivated, and supported me throughout my Trinity journey. He 
inspired me to understand urban perspectives on this and various other topics over the years. Dr. 
Shafqat Hussain not only recommended me to write on Gilgit-Baltistan, but eagerly connected 
me with the diaspora community and sent me numerous thought-provoking sources. Dr. 
Xiangming Chen’s insights into the Belt and Road Initiative in the Global South motivated three 
years of research on China’s increasing influence on Pakistan. Dr. Seth Markle’s International 
Studies seminar equipped me with the necessary research and writing skills to make this idea 
into a tangible reality. I am sincerely grateful for the unending support and guidance of the 
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Center for Urban and Global Studies and International Studies departments at Trinity College. 
Beyond Trinity’s community, I am grateful to Michael Kugelman from the Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars in Washington D.C. for challenging and expanding my 
knowledge of South-Asian politics. Lastly, and certainly not the least, my mother for 
wholeheartedly supporting my academic decisions, and my brother, Hamza, for showing great 
interest in all my academic pursuits.
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Introduction 
 
‘Not Part of Kashmir, but of the Kashmir dispute,’ wrote Martin Sökefeld in the first 
book I read on Kashmir that influenced my decision to write my thesis on Gilgit-Baltistan. 
Nineteen years in Pakistan and I never really knew enough about this sprawling northern region 
of my home country. I was familiar with the region’s infamous flora and fauna, the spectacular 
mountain ranges, and, of course, mystical stories of fairies and dwarves hiding in the fairy 
meadows; however, I knew very little about its socio-political dynamics. Nineteen years in 
Pakistan’s education system and Kashmir was seldom discussed. A chapter on Kashmir was 
skimmed through in my AP-level History course with the sorry explanation, “it belongs to 
Pakistan, but India took it.” No mention of Gilgit-Baltistan, no mention of the larger geopolitical 
circumstances. It was not until a mere few months ago that I was told of its shocking complexity, 
seldom touched upon by Pakistan’s mainstream media.  
As the northernmost region of Pakistan, it borders Azad Kashmir/Pakistan-held Kashmir 
to the south, the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to the west, Afghanistan to the north, and 
China to the east. Its strategical position has unsurprisingly been the cause of much debate and 
bloodshed over the centuries. As a region occupied by the Mughals, British, Dogras, and now 
Pakistan, it has longed for mutual recognition. Its defeat of the draconian Dogra rule post-
independence from the British to expel colonizers and officially integrate into their chosen 
country led to an unexpected turn.  
Gilgit-Baltistan’s relationship with Kashmir, a long-disputed region between India and 
Pakistan, was developed and officialized by the British. The British placed it under the Kashmiri 
state as part of their infamous divide-and-rule strategy. However, the British’s withdrawal from 
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the sub-continent left the region in limbo. All princely states in the sub-continent were allowed to 
choose which country they would want to join; the Hindu Maharaja of Muslim-majority Kashmir 
voted to join India. After region-wide protests and a nationwide war, the United Nations drew a 
ceasefire between Kashmir and divided it between India and Pakistan, with the guarantee that a 
future plebiscite in the disputed region will determine whether it belongs to India or Pakistan. 
The UNSC Resolution 47 detailing conditions of the plebiscite was signed in 1948. It has been 
72 years and the plebiscite has not been held yet.  
Gilgit-Baltistan, in the simplest words possible, is in limbo. It is part of a disputed 
territory because of the British, a territory it holds no similarities to. It has been asked to wait on 
the plebiscite for a final resolution. Thousands of lives were lost fighting the Dogras — the local 
rulers of Kashmir under British control — to live freely in an independent country; a dream cut 
short by Pakistan’s central government. 
This thesis explains the historical socio-political and territorial liminality of Gilgit-
Baltistan. I highlight the region’s odd political relationship with Kashmir, the formation of 
identity conflicts in liminal spaces, and its efforts in gaining provincial status. I further highlight 
China’s historical and present influence over Gilgit-Baltistan and its socio-economic impacts on 
the region. I argue that not only is the region in a state of limbo and ambiguity, but this liminality 
is concretizing. I introduce the concept of permanent liminality in relation to Gilgit-Baltistan’s 
constitutional status and argue that the government of Pakistan has played an active role in 
maintaining and propagating its liminality to sustain control over its resources. This permanence 
is especially manifested through Pakistan’s inability to grant the region provincial status even 
after India, in August 2019, revoked Article 370 of its constitution and officially integrated 
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Indian-held Kashmir into its borders. Finally, I prove that Gilgit-Baltistan’s status quo is not 
temporary, as promised by the federal government, but is indefinite in all its aspects. 
I have used a wide variety of literature in this thesis; from recent newspaper articles on 
the effect of the coronavirus pandemic on Gilgit-Baltistan to books written in the late 19th 
century on the early history of the region. There are a few sources, however, that appear more 
frequently in this thesis and are worth discussing at this stage. Martin Sökefeld, a professor of 
social and cultural anthropology in Germany, has written extensively on the legal-constitutional 
dilemma in Gilgit-Baltistan. Sökefeld’s chapter in Chitrlalekha Zutshi’s book, Kashmir: History, 
Politics, Representation, is quoted widely throughout this thesis. His chapter deals with pre-1947 
and post-1947 political structure and constitutional status of Gilgit-Baltistan. He attempts to 
answer the crucial question on Gilgit-Baltistan’s role within the Kashmir dispute in regard to its 
demands for provincial recognition. I appreciate his explanation of the impact the China-Pakistan 
Economic Corridor has had on the socio-economic fabric of the region. ‘Not Part of Kashmir, 
but the Kashmir Dispute’, is an exceptional summary piece on all aspects of Gilgit-Baltistan. 
‘Liminality and Resistance in Gilgit-Baltistan’ by Caylee Hong, Doctoral Candidate at 
the University of California Berkeley, provides the basis of my argument. Hong details the 
inherent liminality of Gilgit-Baltistan, especially manifested through recent state-sponsored 
political developments in the region. Hong’s description of the unrepresentative government 
structure in Gilgit-Baltistan helped me realize how liminality in law is intentionally disguised by 
the federal government. The resistance to exclusion through local, regional, and international 
means, as emphasized in Hong’s work, allowed me to understand the lack of judicial relief 
available to the people of Gilgit-Baltistan. Her paper is extensively quoted in the chapter on 
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Gilgit-Baltistan’s ambiguous and ever-changing while simultaneously remaining constant 
political structure. 
Besides books and peer-reviewed journals, I also used a wide variety of reports and 
newspapers. The most frequently quoted report in this thesis is the United States Institute of 
Peace Special Report on the ‘Conflict Dynamics in Gilgit-Baltistan’ written by Izhar Hunzai, the 
CEO of the Agha Khan Rural Support Program operating in Gilgit-Baltistan. This report 
illustrates the history of sectarian violence in the hitherto volatile region. It elucidates that the 
surge in sectarian violence was not natural but propagated by the federal government to cause 
unrest and distress in Gilgit-Baltistan. Policy recommendations to alleviate sectarian strife are 
outlined at the end of the report, informing the readers of biased policies against the locals. I 
quote this paper liberally in my chapter on identity conflict in the region. 
Although I have extracted news articles from numerous Indian and Pakistani outlets, I 
regularly reference pieces from Pamir Times, a voluntary and independent news portal of Gilgit-
Baltistan, that provides first-hand accounts and opinions of locals. Various scholars and 
researchers from the region share their findings on the news portal. Understanding locals’ views 
on Pakistan’s treatment of Gilgit-Baltistan informed me of local movements and desperation 
brewing amongst its populace. Pamir Times is frequently quoted in the chapter on China’s 
impact on Gilgit-Baltistan’s socio-economic fabric. 
To further enrich my understanding of this topic, I conducted interviews with three 
members of the Gilgit-Baltistan diaspora community in New York City. I was invited to an event 
on the tourism industry in Gilgit-Baltistan, organized by the region’s community members. 
Initially, I was hesitant to ask sensitive questions at a festive event, but the interviewees were 
passionate about my research and answered my questions enthusiastically. The interviews were 
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semi-structured and included eight questions on Pakistan’s refusal to grant provincial status to 
Gilgit-Baltistan, the region’s relationship with Kashmir, the interviewees’ reasons for migrating 
to New York, sectarian violence in Gilgit-Baltistan, and opinions on the China-Pakistan 
Economic Corridor. In order to protect the identities of the interviewees, I have used 
pseudonyms. My first interviewee was Sarmad Shah, a Hunza resident for 35 years who had 
lived in New York for 34 years; the second interviewee was Ali Sheikh, a Gilgit resident for 18 
years who had lived in. New York for 6 years; the last interviewee was Jamil Iqbal, a Gilgit 
resident for 20 years who had lived in New York for 14 years. Their opinions, some similar and 
some vastly different, on the aforementioned questions are quoted throughout this thesis.  
I have divided this thesis into eight chapters. After this introductory chapter, I explain 
why I decided to write on permanent liminality, a fairly recent urban-political theory, and I 
define some essential terms employed in the thesis; including liminality, liminal space, and 
permanent liminality. I share articles that inspired me to interpret the Gilgit-Baltistan dilemma 
through the lens of permanent liminality.  
The third chapter is titled ‘Roots of Liminality’ and is concerned with the historical 
liminality of Gilgit-Baltistan. I argue that Gilgit-Baltistan has been under colonial rule in all its 
written memory and has always struggled for independence from colonial forces. I journey 
through the region’s forceful association with Kashmir under the oppressive Dogra rule that led 
the locals to revolt and eventually join Pakistan. This chapter presents the necessary historical 
knowledge needed to understand the region’s liminality. 
The fourth chapter, ‘Identity-conflict in Liminal Spaces: The Rise of Sectarian Violence 
in Gilgit-Baltistan’ explores the relationship between constitutional liminality and sectarian 
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violence. I argue that sectarian violence is sponsored by Pakistan’s ruling elite to distract locals 
from protesting for recognition and demanding their constitutional rights.  
The fifth chapter of my thesis, titled ‘Legally Liminal: The Inclusion-Exclusion Paradox’, 
outlines the changing political structures of Gilgit-Baltistan post-1947. I explain how Pakistan’s 
attempts to tighten control under the guise of self-empowerment reforms has led to more unrest 
in the region. I compare the different government structures of Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-
Baltistan, that give more representation to the actual disputed region of Azad Kashmir and less to 
the region that is pleading for official provincial recognition.  
The sixth chapter, ‘In the Dragon’s Shadow: China’s Influence on Gilgit-Baltistan’, 
explains the infamous Aksai Chin border dispute in Kashmir, leading to China’s increasing 
involvement in the Kashmir region post-partition. This chapter explores the socio-economic 
impact of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor on Gilgit-Baltistan’s urban infrastructure. The 
Belt and Road Initiative is possible because of the Karakoram Highway in Gilgit-Baltistan that 
connects neighboring China to Pakistan’s southern Gwadar Port and then to the Middle East and 
Africa. I explore China’s inability to uphold its promise of increased employment and 
transformational infrastructural development in exchange for using the Karakoram Highway. I 
argue that in order to sustain beneficial relations with China, Pakistan will maintain the liminal 
status quo of the Gilgit-Baltistan region. 
The penultimate chapter in this thesis, termed ‘Abrogation of Article 370 and the 
Concretization of Liminality in Gilgit-Baltistan’, proves the government of Pakistan’s intention 
of keeping the region in perpetual limbo. Pakistan’s justification for holding off provincial 
recognition for Gilgit-Baltistan was based on Pakistan’s commitment to upholding the UN 
Resolution that requires both countries to maintain the status quo of divided Kashmir. However, 
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India’s recent annexation of Indian-held Kashmir did not result in Pakistan doing the same. It is 
highly unlikely, if not impossible, that a plebiscite will be conducted now that India has annexed 
its part of Kashmir. Despite this, Pakistan still hasn’t granted provincial status to Gilgit-Baltistan 
and will likely never do so.  
The conclusion briefly summarizes the argument made and emphasizes its significance to 
the international community. I argue that Gilgit-Baltistan is essentially in permanent transition 
now and will continue to remain so unless the international community publicizes the human 
rights abuses and the disenfranchisement of its people. I further argue that numerous cases of 
permanently liminal regions beg the introduction of a sub-field on the topic. 
Writing Note: Gilgit-Baltistan is referred to as GB in some parts of the thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tariq 
 
 
8 
Definition of Terms: Liminality, Liminal Space, and 
Permanent Liminality  
 
 
The Pakistani National Anthem rang through the brightly lit restaurant in a populated 
street of inner Queens, New York. The Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to the 
United States, Asad Majeed Khan, sung along with New York’s Diaspora Gilgit-Baltistan 
Community as the gigantic banner on ‘Tourism in Gilgit-Baltistan’ hung behind him. The host 
for the evening thanked the Ambassador and led the group into a semi-formal prayer for proper 
recognition of Gilgit-Baltistan. The Ambassador did not comment on the region’s ambiguity but 
prayed along. While only managing to formally interview three community members, I struck up 
informal conversations with the other women at my table. Kausar, whose husband was from 
Gilgit-Baltistan, was taken aback when I asked about Pakistan’s refusal to grant Gilgit-Baltistan 
provincial status. “We are a part of Pakistan. We are Pakistan,” exclaimed Kausar. I reminded 
her that Gilgit-Baltistan was not constitutionally a part of Pakistan. “Oh, that’s what you are 
talking about. Now that will never happen.” 
It was as if the ambiguity of the region was all-encompassing in a way that it was hard to 
pin-point anymore. After interviewing a few passionate supporters of provincial recognition for 
Gilgit-Baltistan, I decided to write on its struggle for acceptance. However, Kausar’s statement 
stuck in my mind. It felt she had given up on the fight for constitutional status, she had accepted 
the way things were and was satisfied. This could be due to several reasons; the obvious being 
that she had lived in New York for three years at this point and didn’t have to face the debate 
daily, and because she herself was not from the region. The concept of liminality jumped up to 
me in every text I read about the region. I understand its liminality, as will be explained below, 
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but I kept asking myself; how long can the state of limbo last? How can it be called liminal if it 
hasn’t reached its ‘final destination’ in centuries?  
Johnson and Sørensen’s paper on permanent liminality in organizational studies informed 
my thought-process and this thesis. Although they focused on the permanent liminality of work-
life balance, I read this theory as applicable to the current political situation in Gilgit-Baltistan. 
Murphy and McDowell’s work on the institutionalization of liminal spaces post-conflict further 
elaborates the concept of permanent liminality.1 I argue that the temporal liminal status of Gilgit-
Baltistan has been made permanent because of the promise of an unachievable end-goal, the 
Kashmir plebiscite. This brief chapter will define important terms that will be employed 
throughout this thesis. 
I use Victor Turner’s definition, as Caylee Hong explains it, to describe liminality; “a 
state of transition which is an unstructured in-between phase of rituals where participants 
transition from one social status to another.” He expands on the ambiguity of such a state, 
“liminal entities are neither here or there, they are betwixt and between the positions assigned 
and arrayed by law, custom, convention, and ceremonial.”2 Hong uses the theory of liminality to 
understand the legal-political and territorial status of Gilgit-Baltistan. I expand on this concept by 
additionally using Stefan L. Brandt’s definition of liminality; “Liminality designates the 
condition ascribed to those things or persons who occupy or find themselves in the vicinity of the 
threshold, either on a permanent basis or as a temporary phenomenon.”3 Brandt employed this 
 
1 Joanne Murphy and Sara McDowell, “Transitional Optics: Exploring Liminal Spaces After 
Conflict,” Urban Studies 56, no. 12 (2019): 2501. 
2 Victor W Turner, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure (Piscataway, New Jersey: 
Aldine Transaction 1969), 95.  
3 Stefan L. Brandt, “The City as Liminal Space: Urban Visuality and Aesthetic Experience in 
Postmodern U.S. in Literature and Cinema,” American Studies 52, n. 4 (2009): 569. 
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concept to explain the blurring of the lines between ‘high culture’ and ‘pop culture’ in American 
cities. 
I use the concept of liminal space to explain the vagueness with which Gilgit-Baltistan 
has been classified in history and law. Characterizing Gilgit-Baltistan as a liminal space helps 
explain the geo-political significance of the region and how the decision over space usage is in 
the hands of the central government. Once again, I use Stefan L. Brandt’s brief definition of 
liminal space- a space that symbolizes transition and chance.4 Brandt uses the concept of liminal 
space to explain urban visuality and aesthetic experience in post-modern United States, focusing 
on the ever-changing dynamic of post-modern cities. However, while employing Brandt’s 
definition, I also argue that ‘transitional’ does not imply ‘changing’. Transitional is a state of 
change, not change itself. Gilgit-Baltistan is in the transitional phase but that does not imply that 
the phase is moving to an endpoint. Thus, this phase is permanent. 
As aforementioned, I am using Johnson and Sörenson’s explanation of permanent 
liminality and employing it to Gilgit-Baltistan’s socio-political status. “Permanent liminality has 
been conceptualized as a constant social limbo in which domains that are traditionally separated 
become situated in a zone of indistinction,” write Johnson and Sörenson5 The existence of this 
zone of indistinction is apparent in the region. The locals carry Pakistani ID cards and Pakistani 
passports but cannot vote in national elections. Officials from Gilgit-Baltistan swear allegiance 
to Pakistan but are intermingled with the Kashmir dispute. The zone of indistinction is created 
 
4 Brandt, “The City as Liminal Space: Urban Visuality and Aesthetic Experience in Postmodern 
U.S. in Literature and Cinema,” 561. 
5 Christian Garmann Johnsen and Bent Meier Sørensen, “‘It’s capitalism on coke!’: From 
temporary to permanent liminality in organization studies,” Culture and Organization 21, no. 4 (2015): 
335 
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and propagated by Pakistan’s government — the vagueness of law and devolution of a federally 
controlled local government helps contain dissent. 
It has been argued that permanent liminality, because of its inherent paradox, is just a loss 
of liminality. Essentially, if a state is in permanent limbo, then it is not in limbo anymore. I argue 
that permanent liminality does not result in a loss of liminality; rather it explains the inherent 
ambiguity bred by the state to waver the region from one end to another. If the region wasn’t 
liminal, there wouldn’t be nationalist movements nor assurance of a plebiscite. The people 
expect the transitional phase to reach stable ground, but the government of Pakistan keeps it 
intact. Although the region isn’t moving towards an endpoint, it is moving.  
This thesis explains how liminality operates in Gilgit-Baltistan and why it is permanent in 
nature. The longevity of liminality in Gilgit-Baltistan is created and perpetuated by the 
government of Pakistan through instigating internal strife, disguising federal government’s 
control over the ‘devolved local government’, permitting large-scale development of the 
ecologically sensitive region without compensation, and promising a change in status once the 
long-awaited plebiscite is held. Its permanence is proven by the federal government’s inability to 
keep its promises to the people. Decennary self-empowerment orders have strengthened local 
political structures but maintained the hegemony of the federal government. Pakistan’s ignorance 
of China’s demand to grant Gilgit-Baltistan provincial status further entrenches the government’s 
stance of waiting for the plebiscite. Ironically, the plebiscite excuse fell through when India, in 
August 2019, revoked Article 370 of their constitution and annexed Indian-occupied Jammu and 
Kashmir in complete violation of the agreement signed with United Nations Commission for 
India-Pakistan in 1948 and the bilateral Simla Agreement of 1972, which Pakistan has quoted 
time and again to defend Gilgit-Baltistan’s ambiguous status. Pakistan has no concrete 
 
Tariq 
 
 
12 
justification left to avoid the demands for provincial status. Nevertheless, Pakistan does not need 
to justify her actions to an unrecognized region; thus, institutionalizing and concretizing the 
liminality of the region.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tariq 
 
 
13 
Roots of Liminality: A Geo-Historical Overview 
 
Gilgit-Baltistan has been under colonial rule for all its written history. The people have 
fought for recognition for centuries but have always received the shorter end of the stick. This 
chapter explains the convoluted history of the region, starting from the first written works on the 
region. An overview of the rulers and empires presiding over the region will be given. At the 
crux of this chapter is the relationship between liminality and colonization. The current-day 
ongoing liminality of Gilgit Baltistan is a legacy of colonial rule. The British left no stone 
unturned when it came to expanding their power without considering the rights of the locals. 
Eventually the locals were able to break the chain—at least theoretically—of colonization, but its 
ambiguous status persisted. 
Doctor G.W. Leitner, offers seminal accounts from the mid 19th century on the region 
then known as Dardistan. Leitner detailed the flora and fauna of the region, described its cultural 
and religious diversity, and the common linguistic bond that united the diverse Dards. Leitner, 
more storyteller than scholar, wrote excessively on folk tales, songs, and customs of Dardistan; 
thus, his works were less argumentative and more subjective in nature.6 Although Leitner’s 
intention was to provide an account of his travels across a virgin landscape, it informed how the 
British initially conceptualized the region. Nevertheless, it’s important to highlight Leitner’s 
reference to the “exertions of the Maharaja of Kashmir in promoting the advance of Hindooism,” 
in 1869 suggest that the region was under oppressive before the British invaded it.7 
 
6 G.W. Leitner, Dardistan in 1866, 1886, and 1893 (India: Asian Educational Services, 1996), 6. 
7 G.W. Leitner, "On the Races and Languages of Dardistan," The Journal of the Ethnological 
Society of London (1869-1870) 2, no. 1 (1870): 31, Accessed April 18, 2020. doi:10.2307/3014433. 
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Leitner briefly describes the form of government in Gilgit, a city in Dardistan and capital 
of modern-day Gilgit-Baltistan, when he first visited the region in 1866 as, “practically without a 
ruler, the invading troops of Kashmir barely holding their own within a few yards of the Gilgit 
Fort.”8 Leitner writes that the Gilgitis are kept quiet by the presence of the Dogra-led Kashmir 
army and chiefs of Gilgit are prisoners of the Kashmir government. He claims that the policies of 
Kashmir have killed the intellectual and moral life of Gilgitis.9 Leitner vehemently opposed 
interference and annexation of the region.10 
This Kashmiri Government that Leitner refers to in all his writings is the Dogra rule from 
1840 to 1947/1948 in the region. In early 1800s, the British colonizers, along with the local 
Sikhs, filled the power vacuum left by the Mughal Empire.11 Gulab Singh, a prominent general 
from Punjab, ventured into the virgin Kashmir valley and established Dogra control for more 
than a century.12 The British, although the supreme rulers of the Indian subcontinent, refrained 
from upsetting the powerful and power-hungry Dogras. To appease the opposition and prevent 
revolution, the British signed the March 1846 Treaty of Amritsar—referred to as ‘Sale Deed of 
Kashmir’— which sold Jammu and Kashmir for a mere 75 lacs (present-day 98,000 USD) to 
Gulab Singh. Article 1 of the Treaty of Amritsar reads: 
“The British government transfers and makes over, forever, independent possession, to Maharaja 
Gulab Singh, and the heirs male of his body, all the hilly or mountainous country, with its 
dependencies, situated to the eastward of the river Indus, and westward of the river Ravi, 
including Chamba and excluding Lahore, being part of the territory ceded to the British 
government by the Lahore state, according to the provisions of Article 4 of the Treaty of Lahore, 
dated 9th March 1846.”13 
 
8 Leitner, Dardistan in 1866, 1886, and 1893, 53. 
9 Leitner, Dardistan in 1866, 1886, and 1893, 56. 
10 Hermann Kreutzmann, “Boundaries and space in Gilgit-Baltistan,” Contemporary South Asia 
23 no. 3 (2015): 279-280. 
11 The Mughal Empire ruled the Indian subcontinent and much of South Asia from 1526-1761. 
12 Colonel GD Bakshi, “The Butchers of Baltistan: Dissent and Rebellion in Northern Areas of 
Pakistan,” Indian Defense Review 14, no. 4 (1999).  
13 Treaty of Amritsar, 1846,  https://www.kashmirnetwork.com/justju/stuff/treaty.pdf. 
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Thus, the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, was placed in the ‘forever, independent 
possession’ of Dogra rule. The British readily sold this area off to deter any threat from internal 
opposition but to also avoid sending military and officials into the remote unchartered territory. 
However, at this point in history, Jammu and Kashmir did not include Gilgit. The Treaty of 
Amritsar loosely defined territory transferred to Gulab Singh. Not many had ventured out to the 
northernmost areas of Kashmir, thus, the exact location of regions such as Gilgit wasn’t penned 
down until much later, leaving them to the tyranny of oppressive rulers. In 1846, Singh breached 
the treaty by invading Gilgit, although it was located on the western and not eastern side of the 
Indus river, thereby annexing the area with the state of Jammu and Kashmir.1415 This violation of 
the Treaty of Amritsar would later become a point of contention post-partition. The people of 
Gilgit Baltistan region never officially accepted annexation with Jammu and Kashmir nor did 
they accept Dogra rule.16 The British turned a blind eye to this apparent infringement of the 
treaty and left Singh to his doing until the external threat in the northern region strengthened and 
threatened British’s colonial rule in the subcontinent.  
The British, in fear of, “troublesome Afghanistan, unstable China, and aggressive 
Russia,” surrounding the Jammu and Kashmir area, decided to set up the Gilgit Agency.17 The 
Gilgit Agency, constituting the princely states of Hunza and Nagar, and the smaller entities of 
Chilas, Koh Ghizr, Ishkoman, Yasin and Punial, and the Gilgit Wazarat (consisting of Gilgit 
city, including neighboring towns), controlled the defence, communications, and foreign 
 
14 Christopher Snedden, Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris (London: Hurst and Company, 
2015), 90. 
15 Ehsan Mahmood Khan, “Constitutional Status of Gilgit-Baltistan: An Issue of Human 
Security,” Margalla Papers (2017): 87, https://www.ndu.edu.pk/issra/issra_pub/articles/margalla-
paper/Margalla-Paper-2017/7-Constitutional-Status-Dr-Ehsan-Mehmood-Khan.pdf. 
16 Khan, “Constitutional Status of Gilgit Baltistan: An Issue of Human Security,” 92. 
17 Snedden, Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris, 92. 
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affairs of the region with the help of a political agent in Gilgit City.18 The Gilgit Wazarat —
part of Gilgit Agency—formed the part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir conquered by 
Gulab Singh, whereas the other areas of Gilgit Agency were under the paramountcy of the 
British Government of India. The Agency was created to thwart any threat from regional 
powers, notably after Russia’s capture of Kokand, just 600 miles north of Gilgit.19  They also 
doubted the Maharaja’s willingness to ward off Russian advances in the ‘Great Game’—the 
rivalry between Britain and Russia in Central Asia—that could lead to the downfall of British 
colonial rule in India. A dual administrative structure was configured; Gilgit Agency was 
headed by a British Political Agent and Gilgit Wazarat headed by a Dogra Wazir. Thus, the 
British ruled Gilgit Wazarat, part of Gilgit Agency, with the Dogras. 
In 1935, the British leased Gilgit Agency, which included Gilgit Wazarat, for a period of 
60 years from the then Jammu and Kashmir  Dogra Maharaja Hari Singh to ease the tension of 
‘dual control’.20 Mounting concerns over Dogra’s inadequate and corrupt rule over the 
strategically important region justified the move.  
However, this is when the confusion over Gilgit Baltistan’s territory and its liminality 
became apparent. For decades, as can be concluded from the aforementioned history, Gilgit 
Baltistan has been in flux. Consisting of small independent mountain states from the 16th to the 
19th century, Gilgit was conquered by the oppressive Dogras in the mid 19th century and leased to 
the British in the early 20th century; the region has been in never-ending wait of self-
determination. The Maharaja of Kashmir assumed that once the lease ended, the whole of Gilgit 
 
18 Yaqoob Khan Bangash, “Gilgit-Baltistan — part of Pakistan by choice,” The Express Tribune, 
January 9, 2016, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1024253/gilgit-baltistan-part-of-pakistan-by-choice/. 
19 Snedden, Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris, 93. 
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Agency, not just Gilgit Wazarat, will join Jammu and Kashmir. The British unequivocally stated 
in a March 1941 letter to the Maharaja of Kashmir: 
“1) Hunza and Nagar: though these are under the suzerainty of the Kashmir State, they are not 
part of Kashmir but are separate states; 2) Chilas, Koh Ghizr, Ishkoman, and Yasin: Though 
these are under the suzerainty of Kashmir State they are not part of Kashmir but tribal 
areas.”21 
 
Nonetheless, when the partition and independence were imminent, the British ceased to 
the keep their promise and ‘returned’ the Gilgit Agency to the Maharaja of Kashmir on July 30, 
1947, two weeks before partition.22 The ‘return’ of the Agency to the tyrannical Dogras meant its 
incorporation into a princely state that had never asserted complete political authority over it 
before. None of the local rulers or mirs were consulted before being handed to Kashmir. The 
Indian subcontinent gained independence on August 14, 1947 and was divided into Pakistan and 
India. Provinces in the Indian subcontinent had decided which country to join. However, 
Kashmir was a point of contention; with a Hindu ruler and Muslim majority the decision was 
deemed to be controversial. 
William Brown, the Britisher in charge of transferring power over Gilgit Agency to Hari 
Singh, realized that the locals in Gilgit feared succession to India. A local Gilgiti told Brown: 
“The whole of what was the Gilgit Agency is pro Pakistan. There is no doubt about it. We are all 
Muslims: do you blame us? We could never swear allegiance to Hindustan. If Kashmir remains 
independent, well and good. We shall be independent here but we can also keep the friendliest 
relations with our brother Moslems in Pakistan. If Kashmir accedes to Pakistan, even better. But 
if the Maharaja through pig-headedness, bad advice, political pressure, or attractive remuneration 
acceded to Hindustan then there will be trouble here.”23 
 
20 Martin Sökefeld, “Not Part of Kashmir, but the Kashmir Dispute: The Political Predicaments of 
Gilgit Baltistan,” in Kashmir: History, Politics, and Representation, ed. Chitralekha Zutshi, 132-150. 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 134. 
21 Bangash, “Gilgit-Baltistan — part of Pakistan by choice.” 
22 Sökefeld, “Not Part of Kashmir, but the Kashmir Dispute,” 135. 
23 William Brown, Gilgit Rebellion: The Major who Mutinied over Partition of India (United 
Kingdom: Pen and Sword, 2014): 48. 
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On October 26, 1947, Hari Singh acceded Kashmir, including the Gilgit Agency, to India. 
Pakistan vehemently opposed this move on the grounds that the Dogra state had committed open 
atrocities against the Muslims and Hari Singh had fled the Kashmir Valley after partition and 
should not be allowed to take a decision on behalf of the Kashmiris. Immediately after, Major 
Brown received a telegram from the prince of Chitral, a princely state that had already joined 
Pakistan, that read: ‘Chitral is breaking off all relations with the Kashmir Government. Neither 
my state nor Gilgit can accept accession of Kashmir to Hindustan.’24 This was seen as an 
informal claim by Pakistan to Gilgit. On November 1, after a successful coup, the Gilgit Scouts25 
raised the Pakistani flag in Gilgit Agency and formed a provisional government that called the 
Government of Pakistan to take over. The Gilgit Scouts conquered hilly Baltistan on 14 August 
1948 and officially integrated it into the Gilgit Agency.26  
Formally, Pakistan took charge of the region through the Karachi Agreement in 1949. 
However, Pakistan’s treatment of Gilgit Baltistan over the years can be described as ‘post-
colonial colonialism’.27 Decades of suffering under Hindu Dogra and Christian British rule led 
the Scouts to revolt against tyranny and in the process lose hundreds of their own. However, in 
return, Pakistan refused to give this region provincial status and reinforced its limbo status. 
The Gilgit region has had an unfortunate history of liminality. The British created a 
liminal space to protect it against Russian, Afghan, and Chinese invasion, without losing the 
 
24 Yaqoob Khan Bangash, “Three Forgotten Accessions: Gilgit, Hunza, and Nagar,” The Journal 
of Imperial and Commonwealth History 38, no. 1 (February 2010): 129, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/03086530903538269. 
25 The Gilgit Scouts was a paramilitary force of the Gilgit Agency in the northern Jammu and 
Kashmir. They were raised from the local populations of the Gilgit Agency in 1889, and commanded by 
British officers. They played an integral role in fighting the war of liberation against the Dogras in 
1947/1948. 
26 Sökefeld, “Not Part of Kashmir, but the Kashmir Dispute,” 135. 
27 Sökefeld, “Not Part of Kashmir, but the Kashmir Dispute,” 136. 
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necessary support from the Dogras. Since its inception, the Agency held an ambiguous territorial 
and political identity. Gulab Singh occupied Gilgit because of the vagueness and lack of clarity 
of the Treaty of Amritsar. The British, through maintaining an undefined political and territorial 
limit to the Agency, ‘returned’ it to the Dogra rulers. The borders remained undefined, causing 
much confusion and chaos during partition.  
Current-day Pakistan takes advantage of the region’s liminality to further its own 
agendas; major Muslim vote bank if plebiscite held, undemocratic widespread Chinese 
development, persecution of Shia Muslims, etc. Since integrating with Pakistan, the region’s 
boundaries are territorially defined but remain politically and economically undefined. 
 
Timeline for rule over the Gilgit-Baltistan Region 
1842: Occupation of Gilgit by Dogra of Kashmir 
1846: Treaty of Amritsar; State of Kashmir founded; Territory demarcated at East of 
Indus. 
1872: British Empire establish agent in Gilgit; Gilgit ruled by Dogra Wazir and British 
agent. 
1935: British Empire leases Gilgit Agency for a period of sixty years from Kashmiri 
state. 
July 30, 1947: British Empire returns Gilgit Agency to the Maharaja of Kashmir. 
August 14, 1947: British withdrawal from the Indian subcontinent; Partition of India and 
Pakistan 
October 26, 1947: Maharaja of Kashmir acceded Kashmir, including Gilgit Agency, to 
India. 
November 1, 1947: GB overthrew Dogra rule and declared accession to Pakistan.  
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Identity Conflict in Liminal Spaces: The Rise of Sectarian 
Violence in Gilgit Baltistan  
 
Belonging to a concretizing liminal space erases common conception of national identity. 
Additionally, if that betwixt space is heavily militarized, tightened, and monopolized, as to 
compress the physical and psychological space of its residents, the search for identity takes 
aggressive forms.28 Political forces, instead of directing the lost, fuel disturbances to shift 
internal priorities. 
Gilgit-Baltistan celebrates two independence days, one on Pakistan’s official 
Independence Day, another to commemorate independence from Dogra Raj; however, despite 
celebrating two days of independence, the region is still in desperate search of tangible identity 
and recognition.29 According to Bouzas, this dislocation and confusion are exacerbated by the 
mandatory carrying of Pakistan National Identity cards (NIC) for all GB residents, but unique 
identifications cards for residents of Azad Jammu and Kashmir. Gilgit-Baltistan’s “waiting to-
be-a-part-of-Pakistan”30 has created an identity conflict amongst locals that has manifested in the 
form of sectarian violence. However, it is imperative to clarify that the absence of national 
identity did not naturally led to an extreme association with religion. The government of Pakistan 
actively encouraged religious disparity in Gilgit-Baltistan to quell questions of national identity 
and thrust the relatively peaceful region in decades of unpoliced and unchecked sectarian 
violence.  
 
28 Muhammad Feyyaz, “Geopolitics, Statehood, Violence, and Space compression in Gilgit-
Baltistan,” South Asian History and Culture 10, no.1 (February 2019): 30. 
29 Waseem Abbas Bagoro, “Gilgit-Baltistan: In Search of Identity,” Pamir Times, November 1, 
2018, https://pamirtimes.net/2018/11/01/gilgit-baltistan-in-search-of-identity/. 
30 Antío Mato Bouzas, “Territorialization, Ambivalence, and Representational Spaces in Gilgit-
Baltistan,” Transcultural Studies, no. 1 (2017): 211. 
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Chitralekha Zutshi, a leading historian on the political culture of Kashmir, discusses how 
discourses of religious identity became embedded in Kashmir in the 1920s to solidify a basis for 
community formation.31 Unsurprisingly, such discourses were absent in the multi-lingual and 
multi-ethnic region of present-day Gilgit-Baltistan, as Gilgit-Baltistan had never intended 
involvement in the Kashmir dispute, nor did it comprise of a significant non-Muslim population. 
The majority of Gilgit-Baltistan’s population comprises of Shia Muslims, followed by Sunni and 
Ismaili Muslims. Nevertheless, the shared religious identity of different communities had rarely 
created violent rifts between the people of Gilgit-Baltistan.32 The only religious-based conflict 
that existed in the region pre-1947 was the Shia-Sunni conflict but that remained mostly 
unnoticeable and limited to localized disputes resolved by the community elders.33 
The formation of sectarian discourses as an identity marker stemmed from ideological 
imprisonment of the country by the draconian military regimes of Ayub Khan and Zia-ul-Haq, 
former martial-law-inducted military leaders of Pakistan. Khan and Zia suspended political 
socialization and censored channels of political participation which compounded frustration 
amongst the already disenfranchised.  The United States Institute of Peace released a detailed 
report on state-sanctioned sectarian conflict in Gilgit-Baltistan which comprehensively outlined 
Zia’s role in breeding disharmony in the hitherto disillusioned territory against the Shia majority 
of Gilgit-Baltistan. The report highlights Zia-ul-Haq’s militarization of the socio-religious fabric 
of the state, thrusting Wahhabi-oriented-Islamization in the penal code, constitution, and 
educational policy. The laws of the nation detailed in Pakistan’s constitution are consistent with 
 
31 Chitralekha Zutshi, Languages of Belonging: Islam, Regional Identity, and the Making of 
Kashmir (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004): 120.  
32 Antío Mato Bouzas, “Territorialization, Ambivalence, and Representational Spaces in Gilgit-
Baltistan,” 211. 
33 Izhar Hunzai, “Conflict Dynamics in Gilgit-Baltistan,” Special Report United States Institute of 
Peace 321 (2013): 3, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/SR321.pdf. 
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Sunni principles.34 Moreover, Zia-ul-Haq amended the colonial penal code to ensure that not 
only non-Muslims, but also non-Sunni Muslims, could easily be convicted of committing 
blasphemy. In the name of religious purification, Zia mandated imposition of religious taxes - 
zakat and ushr - and initiated orthodox-Sunni religious seminaries-madrassas.35 Zia-ul-Haq’s 
government unashamedly threw state support behind Sunni-led extremist groups, leading to the 
creation of pro-Shia armed organizations, causing brutal violence between the sects. His 
treacherous reign saw the state-sponsored Gilgit Massacre of the region’s Shia population in 
1988, ingraining ideas of exclusivity based on religious belief.36 Additionally, population 
transfers encouraged by the government of Pakistan have led Punjabi Sunnis, retaining their 
Pakistani citizenship and motivated by favorable resettlement policies, move to Gilgit-Baltistan 
and shift the demographics of the region.37 As the only Shia-majority region in the country, 
Gilgit-Baltistan is most affected by the government’s orthodox Sunni stance. 
The vacuum of political identity ushered in government-sanctioned sectarian violence, a 
dangerous relief for the frustrated masses of Gilgit-Baltistan. The legal liminality remained 
whereas the psychological liminality of being ‘in-between’ was replaced with wrongly 
intentioned religious identity. Pakistan’s fundamental role in corrupting the peaceful landscape is 
most evident from the government of former president Pervez Musharraf’s notorious textbook 
policy allegedly implemented to form a general national identity to overcome ‘differences’ and 
ensure a blanket educational experience in the country. In 1999, Islamabad introduced amended 
textbooks, produced by the government-funded textbook board of Pakistan, authored by Sunnites 
 
34 Anita D. Raman, “Of Rivers and Human Rights: The Northern Area, Pakistan’s Forgotten 
Colony in Jammu and Kashmir,” International Journal and Minority and Group Rights 11, no. 1 (2004): 
189. 
35 Izhar Hunzai, “Conflict Dynamics in Gilgit-Baltistan,” 4. 
36 Feyyaz, “Geopolitics, Statehood, Violence, and Space compression in Gilgit-Baltistan,” 38. 
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of the Deobandi School.38 Islamiyat books were riddled with Sunni practices and presented 
Islamic practices in a strictly Sunnite way. History, Urdu, and English subjects included Sunni-
only references, instigating feelings of further disillusionment amongst the majority Shia 
populace of GB. The government of Pakistan assured the immediate recalling of offensive 
textbooks but backtracked, “lending credence to the suspicion that the move for curriculum 
change was calculated to keep the flames of sectarianism burning.”39 GB Shia leader Zia-uddin 
negotiated with the Education Ministry to revise the biased syllabus for years on end; he was 
gunned down in 2005 for spearheading the movement against state-sponsored divisive tactics.40 
Even-after the region’s tireless struggle for freedom, the state kept pushing its colonial 
ideology on its bodies. The looming power vacuum provides an ideal breeding ground for 
religious tensions. However, the states’ intention to create a unified identity of Kashmir, which 
Gilgit-Baltistan is legally considered a part of, by distracting nationalist movements in Gilgit-
Baltistan has led to increased localization and resentment in the region.41 The ideological paths 
of Kashmir and GB are diverging; nevertheless, this makes a negligible impact on Pakistan’s 
intentions to sustain the constitutional ambiguity of Gilgit-Baltistan.  
Shireen Hunter of Georgetown University, writes about post-war identity conflict in Iraq; 
“Sectarian conflict is the result of two interrelated factors: years of discrimination against the 
Shias by repressive Iraqis governments and the failure to develop a sense of national identity 
 
37 Raman, “Of Rivers and Human Rights: The Northern Area, Pakistan’s Forgotten Colony in 
Jammu and Kashmir,” 188. 
38 George Stöber, “Religious Identities Provoked: The Gilgit ‘Textbook Controversy’ and its 
Conflictual Context,” Internationale Schulbuchforschung 29, no. 4 (2007): 391. 
39 Seema Shekhawat, “Sectarianism in Gilgit-Baltistan,” Faultlines 20, no.4 (January 2011): 92. 
40 Stöber, “Religious Identities Provoked: The Gilgit ‘Textbook Controversy’ and its Conflictual 
Context,” 393. 
41 Aziz Ali Dad, “Boundaries and Identities: The Case of Gilgit-Baltistan,” Crossroads Asia 
Working Paper Series, no. 34 (2016): 24. 
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transcending tribal and sectarian affiliations; and fears generated among the Sunnis about their 
future economic and political position under a Shia-dominated government.”42 Ideological 
warfare, rooted in recognition, has transformed into bloody sectarian violence, weakening the 
region internally. Inability to restrain state-sponsored sectarian violence can attributed to the 
government’s draconian censorship of political activity in the region coupled with a lack of 
representation in the National Assembly and the locals’ inability to access the Supreme Court. 
The compression and reorganization of public space have, “effectually caused irreversible cracks 
in the collective memory of Gilgit-Baltistan.”43 Loss of initial purpose of recognition, replaced 
by sectarian identity, has merged the people with the magnetic force of their liminal territory, 
diving deeper into ambiguity and disillusionment legally and psychologically.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 Shireen Hunter, “Sunni-Shia Tensions Are More About Politics, Power and Privilege than 
Theology,” Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, Georgetown 
University, February 5, 2007, http://acmcu.georgetown.edu/135390.html.  
43 Feyyaz, “Geopolitics, Statehood, Violence, and Space compression in Gilgit-Baltistan,” 40. 
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Legally Liminal: The Inclusion-Exclusion Paradox 
 
Post-1947 Governance  
 
The seeds of liminality sown by the British were believed to have vanished once 
Pakistan’s government, through the Karachi Agreement of 1949, officially announced 
administrative control over Gilgit-Baltistan. Residents of the region rejoiced and believed 
Pakistan would soon grant them provincial status. The people from the region never sought 
allegiance with Kashmir and were confident that the government of Pakistan would recognize 
this difference. After centuries of external and unfavorable rule, Gilgit Baltistan was finally 
accepted into their country of choice. However, unbeknownst to them, their ambiguous status 
was soon to be permanently entrenched. 
The Federal Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas (KANA) — separate from 
the Azad Jammu and Kashmir government—was established in January 1949 and present-day 
Gilgit Baltistan was taken under its direct federal rule. While Azad Kashmir had its own semi-
autonomous government at this point, Gilgit Agency (including present-day Gilgit Baltistan) 
were directly managed by the federal government. No leader from Gilgit was asked before 
control was handed to KANA.44 Additionally, KANA administered Gilgit and adjoining areas 
through the Frontier Crimes regulation (FCR), “a notorious set of laws that allowed collective 
punishments, outlawed political activity, and denied basic rights.”45 Residents were required to 
report to local police stations once a month. 
 
44 Jamil Nagri, “Almost Pakistan: Gilgit-Baltistan in a constitutional limbo,” DAWN Newspaper, 
Jan 19, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1198967. 
45 Unrepresented Nations and People’s Organization, “Gilgit-Baltistan’s History of Political 
Exclusion,” April 22, 2016, https://unpo.org/article/19113. 
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The region remained under direct federal control until Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto 
visited the region and decided to grant it proper political and socio-economic structure. In 1972, 
he announced the abolition of all princely states (including Hunza, Nagar, Baltistan, and Gilgit 
Agency) and created a single administrative unit termed the Northern Areas.46 Bhutto formed the 
Northern Areas Advisory Council, an 18-member representative body chosen through direct 
elections and headed by a commissioner. However, this body had no representation in 
mainstream political institutions. The FCR was repealed but the region remained outside 
Pakistan’s political sphere. It is imperative to note that the realization to arrange the scattered 
territories and assemble a single administration in the region came 23 years after Gilgit-Baltistan 
swore allegiance to the country. 
Military ruler Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamization policies of 1980s created indecisiveness and 
identity crises alien to the region. For centuries, culturally and religiously diverse people lived in 
harmony in the Northern Areas. Their liminal and volatile territory and ambiguous political 
status was the sole point of regional anxiety. The cumulative effect of the Iran revolution and 
Islamization led to an ideologically motivated battle manifesting itself through widespread 
sectarian violence against the Shia majority. Anti-Shia laws and biased educational syllabi 
pushed through Wahabi-oriented Islamization led to an infamous massacre of 400 Shia 
community members in Gilgit in 1988.47  Shia and Sunni militant organizations started 
operations in the disenfranchised region. Internal divisiveness diverted energy from the political 
struggle for provincial recognition and maintained the region’s political ambiguity for the next 
two decades. 
 
46 Jamil Nagri, “Almost Pakistan: Gilgit-Baltistan in a constitutional limbo.” 
47 Izhar Hunzai, “Izhar Hunzai, “Conflict Dynamics in Gilgit-Baltistan,” 5. 
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Former President Pervez Musharraf’s creation of a Northern Areas Legislative Assembly 
in 1999, which was answerable to the federal government and unrepresented in Pakistan’s 
National Assembly, was another confirmation of Pakistan’s efforts to maintain the status quo 
under the guise of Article 257 of Pakistan’s constitution; “When the people of the State of 
Jammu and Kashmir decide to accede to Pakistan, the relationship between Pakistan and that 
State shall be determined in accordance with the wishes of the people of that State.” 48 Pakistan’s 
government had used the aforementioned article to repeatedly justify their colonial tactics in 
Gilgit Baltistan, which was considered part of Kashmir. Gilgit Baltistan remained adamant to 
integrate into Pakistan while the government of Pakistan ignored its decades-old demand, 
emphasizing that granting provincial status to Gilgit Baltistan would mean losing claim over the 
whole of Kashmir. Thus, Gilgit Baltistanis, who never wanted to be trapped in the dispute, were 
left to wait for the unlikely plebiscite.  
 
Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan 
With increasing devolution of power, Gilgit-Baltistan expected amalgamation to be on 
the horizon. The notorious Al-Jehad Supreme Court ruling of 1999 reversed all expectations and 
entrenched the ambiguity of the region’s political standing. In 1994, residents of Northern Areas 
along with the Al-Jehad Trust filed two constitutional petitions in the Supreme Court, demanding 
participation in national politics and access to an independent judiciary. In May 1999, the 
Supreme Court of Pakistan announced that the people of Northern Areas are citizens of Pakistan 
for all intents and purposes, are liable to pay taxes, are entitled to participate in the governance of 
 
48 National Assembly of Pakistan, “The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan,” August 
14, 1973. Modified upto February 28, 2012. 
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their area, and are qualified to seek jurisdiction from a local High Court. On the surface, the 
Supreme Court’s recognition of Northern Area residents as Pakistani citizens could have been 
seen as an informal announcement of official provincial status. As citizens, they have 
fundamental rights guaranteed to all; the right to representation, the right to vote, and the right to 
access justice through an independent judiciary. However, none of these rights were practically 
granted to the region. Additionally, the judgement also said:  
“It may be observed that since the geographical location of the Northern Areas is very 
sensitive because it is bordering India, China, Tibet and [former] USSR, and as the above 
areas in the past have also been treated differently, this Court cannot decide what type of 
Government should be provided to ensure the compliance with the above mandate of the 
Constitution. Nor we can direct that the people of Northern Areas should be given 
representation in the Parliament as, at this stage, it may not be in the larger interest of the 
country because of the fact that a plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations is to 
be held.”49  
 
In essence, the Supreme Court validated the legitimacy of the requests written in the 
petition but maintained Pakistan’s official stance on the region. To ‘protect the larger interest of 
the country’, the Supreme Court effectively stated that representation of Northern Areas in the 
National Assembly is highly unlikely. Instead, locals are expected to be satisfied with minimal 
regional representation and access to the High Court, not the Supreme Court. The blatantly 
hypocritical judgement, that recognizes people of GB as citizens but refuses representation in the 
most critical decision-making body of Pakistan, concretizes the liminality of GB’s people “Al-
Jehad Trust shows the role of the formal law in analyzing, describing and ultimately justifying 
this constitutional liminality,” writes Caylee Hong.50 The people of Gilgit-Baltistan lost faith in 
Pakistan’s judiciary after this convoluted ruling. Freedom House, an acclaimed think tank based 
 
49 Livia Holden, “Law, Governance, and Culture in Gilgit-Baltistan- Introduction,” South Asian 
History and Culture 10, no.1 (2019): 5. 
50 Caylee Hong, “Liminality and Resistance in Gilgit-Baltistan,” Legal Working Paper Series on 
Legal Empowerment for Sustainable Development (2012), 7. 
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in New York City, researched on the judicial system of Gilgit-Baltistan. They highlighted that all 
judicial appointments in Gilgit-Baltistan’s High Court are subject to discretionary renewal by the 
bureaucracy, leaving the judiciary largely subservient to the executive governemnt. In addition, 
final approving authority on judicial matters rests with Islamabad, further delegitimizing the 
court’s powers.51 The judicial system is then correctly deemed as an institution that, “explicitly 
linked to their liminality and exclusion.”52  
 
Gilgit-Baltistan Reforms OF 2009 and 2018: Liminality in Disguise 
The highly anticipated Gilgit Empowerment and Self-Governance Order of 2009 
renamed Northern Areas to Gilgit Baltistan and, finally, recognized the administrative autonomy 
and quasi-provincial status of the Northern Areas. The people of GB expected widespread 
reforms but were, once again, left disappointed and appalled by the federal government’s 
inadequacy. This Act established a Legislative Assembly for the region which held limited, if 
any, power at all. The management of natural resources and tourism, the major industries in 
Gilgit Baltistan, were allocated to the Gilgit Baltistan Council directed by the Prime Minister of 
Pakistan.53  
Caylee Hong outlines foundational issues with the supposedly revolutionary 2009 Order 
which perfectly illustrates the liminality of the region. Firstly, Gilgit-Baltistan was still lacking 
representation in the National Assembly, as the Federal Government reassured locals that the 
democratic deficit will be overcome once the Kashmir conflict is resolved. Thus, an 
 
51 Austrian Red Cross, “Pakistan-Administered Kashmir (Azad Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan),” 
Commissioned by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Division of International 
Protection (May 2012): 20. 
52 Hong, “Liminality and Resistance in Gilgit-Baltistan,” 18. 
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impermanent, transitory environment is retained in the region. Secondly, as discussed below, the 
2009 Order substantiates liminality by excluding the region from the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court of Pakistan. An inferiority complex is manifested through this ‘some citizens are more 
equal than others’ ruling. Most importantly, the Order refers to the region as a ‘province’ without 
granting it provincial status. The vagueness of the ruling and the convoluted language of the 
federal Order reify the region’s enduring liminality.54  
Ehsan Mahmood Khan, a Major-General of Gilgit Baltistan, described the 2009 order as, 
“a manifestation of the administrative linkage of the GB region with the federation of Pakistan, a 
part of Pakistan not forming part of a province,” in context of Article 258 of Pakistan’s 
constitution which grants the President freewill over regions without provincial status, 
highlighting the federal government’s shrouded legal control over Gilgit Baltistan.55   
After nationwide protests and calls for change, the Federal Government approved the 
Gilgit Baltistan Order 2018, which replaced the 2009 Order. The only reform worth mentioning 
was that the Gilgit-Baltistan Assembly was transferred all powers previously exercised by the 
Council. The Prime Minister of Pakistan described the Order as a, “milestone for GB as drastic 
amendments had been made to ensure development of the region and uplift of the people.”56 
However, Part IV Article 41 of the 2018 Order reads, “The government of Gilgit-Baltistan will 
be bound to the instructions of Pakistan’s Prime Minister,” amongst other ‘prime minister-
 
53 Holden, “Law, Governance, and Culture in Gilgit-Baltistan- Introduction,” 4. 
54 Hong, “Liminality and Resistance in Gilgit-Baltistan,” 9. 
55 Khan, “Constitutional Status of Gilgit Baltistan: An Issue of Human Security,” 95. 
56 News Desk, “Gilgit-Baltistan Order 2018: GB Government to Enjoy Greater Powers: PM,” 
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centric’ articles.57 Unsurprisingly, this Order was eventually rejected for reestablishing the status 
quo and for ignoring the repeated demands for recognition.  
Gilgit Baltistan was a stone’s throw away from complete provincial status every time a 
new ordinance was announced. A constant feeling of disorientation and ambiguity plague the 
region leading to an eternal sense of incompletion; an impatience for a verdict that will never 
come. Holden, a renowned anthropologist who has extensively written on Gilgit-Baltistan, 
applies Skakolczai’s work on liminality to the paradox of Gilgit Baltistan; “a temporary situation 
which becomes, ‘extended, lasting, all eventually but a permanent state.”58 
As will be discussed in later chapters, the inaction of the federal government cannot be 
disguised under the pretense of a possible plebiscite any longer. The region remains in perpetual 
limbo as updated ordinances seemingly devolve power but fail to recognize the people of Gilgit 
Baltistan’s nearly century-long demand.   
 
Government Structures of Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan 
“We never wanted to be a part of Kashmir but if we are ‘Kashmir’ then why are we not 
given a representative government like theirs? The government of Pakistan has robbed us of our 
rights for decades,” emphatically claimed Ali Sheikh, one of my interviewees and a recent 
immigrant to New York from Gilgit-Baltistan. His desperation to witness more representation at 
home was evident during our interview. If Gilgit-Baltistan is part of the larger Kashmir issue, 
then why does Azad Kashmir have a more representative government? Although both areas have 
 
57 Samina Shah, “Gilgit-Baltistan Order 2018: A Copy-Paste Bureaucratic Endeavor,” Pamir 
Times, June 5, 2018, https://pamirtimes.net/2018/06/05/gilgit-baltistan-order-2018-a-copy-paste-
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no representation in the national parliament, Azad Kashmir has enjoyed autonomy since its 
integration into Pakistan. AK has a constitution, elected government, a prime minister, and a 
president. The 41-member elected government presides over all administrative matters except 
state’s finances. Although the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council is headed by Pakistan’s Prime 
Minister who has the unchallengeable power to override laws passed by AJK’s elected 
legislature, it has very little authority in practice.59 The Prime Minister of Pakistan cannot 
overrule the Prime Minister of Kashmir when it comes to most internal matters. 
Gilgit Baltistan, in contrast to Azad Kashmir, is ruled through ordinances instead of a 
constitution. The Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order of 2009 details the 
administrative system of the region. The Prime Minister of Pakistan, who presides over Gilgit 
Baltistan Council, is the de-facto president of the region in accordance to the 2009 ordinance. 
The 15-member Council includes six members from the 33-member Gilgit Baltistan Legislative 
Assembly and nine Pakistani parliamentary members appointed by the governor. Final authority 
rests with the governor, whose decisions cannot be overruled by the Assembly.60 Nevertheless, 
the governor himself is federally appointed along with the chief minister and is answerable to 
Islamabad, not the local people. 
Numerous striking differences between political structures of the collective disputed 
territory are noteworthy. As above-mentioned, AJK is governed through its Interim Constitution 
Act of 1974 that spells out its status under United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. In 
contrast, GB is ruled through ad hoc laws framed by the Government of Pakistan without 
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consulting the locals. The 2009 ordinance briefly refers to the UN resolutions without correctly 
identifying them.  
Secondly, political officials of AJK take oaths of office to ‘remain loyal to the country 
and the cause of accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan’. Whereas, oaths of 
office in GB demand local officials to ‘remain loyal to Pakistan’. Both regions are deemed 
disputed but declare allegiance to different entities, assuming that, “AJK is yet to accede, while 
GB has already acceded.”61 
Lastly, the State Subject Rule (SSR) has been abolished in GB but remains intact in Azad 
Kashmir. For the sake of clarity, it is essential to explain the relevance of SSR to the region. The 
News Pakistan published an article titled ‘The Case of Gilgit-Baltistan’ in August 2019, detailing 
the abolishment of the SSR, an often-forgotten human rights violation perpetuated by the 
national government. State-subject rule maintains the demographics of the region by limiting 
property purchase to the region’s residents only. Martin Sökefeld, in his chapter on the liminality 
of Gilgit-Baltistan in Kashmir: History, Politics, and Representation, emphatically opposed 
Pakistan’s revocation of the State Subject Rule (SSR) in Gilgit Baltistan. In 1974, former Prime 
Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto abolished SSR and allowed residents from other provinces to buy 
land in Gilgit Baltistan. This violates all Kashmir agreements signed and ratified by India and 
Pakistan. 
 
61 Vikas Kumar, “India’s Gilgit-Baltistan Problem—Part One: Pakistan’s Dependence on Gilgit-
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Most locals have repeatedly demanded restoration of SSR.62 Some viewed this as a sign 
of Pakistan’s official recognition of Gilgit Baltistan as a province. Some believe that the 
diversity of the region will be affected if SSR is enacted again. Instead, there should be a special 
bill of rights in Gilgit-Baltistan which would clearly define residents of Gilgit-Baltistan and 
safeguard their rights against encroachment and usurpation of their lands, jobs, resources and 
social and political rights.63 It is also argued that SSR was a colonial tool that trapped Gilgit 
Baltistanis within their region and thus should be revised. 
However, Sökefeld disagrees. He believes that the revocation of SSR led to an imbalance 
in the region. Sunni Muslims moved to Gilgit Baltistan, shifting the Shia majority and causing 
unprecedented sectarian violence. In addition, rich landowners started buying swaths of precious 
land for profit. The locals were once again left baffled. One needs to understand that land is a 
precious commodity in the mountainous terrain. Not only has the revocation of SSR led to 
migrants from other provinces but has also increased land grabbing efforts by Pakistani nationals 
and neighboring China. The government of Pakistan allocated 500 acres of land for a special 
economic zone for trade with China in GB without seeking approval from locals.64  
The official website of Pakistan’s defence forces claims that Pakistan never abolished 
SSR because SSR was never formally established in GB. They claim that SSR was 
‘theoretically’ extended to GB since GB was under the rule of Maharaja of Kashmir.65 It is 
interesting how the Pakistani government believes SSR was never extended to GB because it was 
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not directly under the rule of the Maharaja of Kashmir but also believes that GB is part of the 
Kashmir conflict. This further reinforces the ambiguity and liminality of the region.  
 
Resisting Liminality 
Gilgit Baltistan hasn’t remained quiet in the face of another colonial set-up. Martin 
Sökefeld credits Mirza Hasan Khan, a leading figure of the war for accession, for sowing the 
seeds of dissent amongst his community. He formed the first political party of the region, the 
Gilgit League, in 1956, which was dissolved once martial law was declared in 1958. Young men 
from present-day GB started attending esteemed Pakistani universities and gradually realized the 
façade of autonomy in their region. The Tanzim-e-Millat Party was formed, under the leadership 
of local leader Johar Ali Khan, in 1971 to demand abolition of the princely state and provincial 
status to the then Northern Areas.66 However, sectarian conflict seeped through the region 
causing rivalry amongst local political parties. The Gilgit Baltistan Jamhuri Mahaz was 
formulated in direct opposition to Tanzim-e-Millat. Sunni-dominated Jamhuri Mahaz supported 
accession of GB with Azad Jammu and Kashmir to create a unified state with a Sunni majority.67  
Zia-ul-Haq prohibited political activism and dissent across the nation in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s but political activity rose again in the late 1980s with the establishment of the 
Karakorum National Movement (KNM). Led by students and activists from the region, the 
Movement spelled its demands for provincial status and representation in National Assembly. 
 
65 M. Sarmad, “State Subject Rule and Gilgit Baltistan,” Pakistan Defence, August 12, 2019, 
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KNM was followed by the Balwaristan National Front (BNF) that too called for real autonomy 
but through the creation of an independent Gilgit-Baltistan country. BNF’s anti-Pakistan stance 
was cultivated and promoted by the Indian government. Although BNF’s intentions were to seek 
independence, the unintended result of their vitriol against the federal government led to a 
nationwide recognition of Pakistan’s neglect of GB.68 Pakistan People’s Party Gilgit Baltistan 
faction has gained prominence over the past two decades due to its allegiance with one of the 
largest political parties in Pakistan but also because of its disapproval of the removal of 
aforementioned SSR. Gilgit-Baltistan’s political parties, quite evidently, operate on opposing 
platforms. The Awami Action Committee (AAC), an alliance of political groups from GB, has 
long demanded autonomy for the region in some form. Efforts of AAC to secure rights for the 
people of GB came to light in the immediate aftermath of the 2018 Order. “There is a significant 
difference between the administrative structure in Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan. There is a 
state setup in Azad Kashmir, while Gilgit-Baltistan is still being run through ordinances,” 
complained AAC when comparing GB and AJK governments.69 The AAC was attacked by 
police when protesting against the 2018 reforms in Gilgit, causing several injuries to local 
officials.70 
Even though Zia’s tyrannical reign ended four decades ago, political dissent in Gilgit 
Baltistan is often censored by the federal government. Baba Jan, GB resident turned political 
activist, organized homeless people to seek compensation and rehabilitation from the federal 
government after the January 2010 landslides in Gilgit-Baltistan. In 2011, he and his fellow 
activists led the protest for the rights of uncompensated families and were met with open fire 
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from the police that killed several innocent civilians. He, along with 11 other activists, were 
convicted of being involved in political riots under the Anti-Terrorism Act and sentenced to 40-
years imprisonment.71 Noam Chomsky, along with other prominent global figures, have signed 
petitions for his release but Jan remains in jail. Thus, the false promise of freedom of speech for 
‘citizens of Pakistan’ evidently does not apply to residents of Gilgit-Baltistan.   
Caylee Hong highlights international efforts to resist liminality in the region. 
“International attention is seen as necessary to contest constitutional liminality,” claims Hong.72 
She highlights the European Parliament’s diplomatic intervention in Gilgit-Baltistan to 
demonstrate the necessity of engaging in international activism to have their demands heard. The 
2007 European Parliament Report on the democratic deficit in Gilgit Baltistan led to the 
formation of the 2009 Order.73 This report not only heavily criticized Pakistan’s inability to grant 
democratic representation to the people of Gilgit-Baltistan but also connects GB’s plight with the 
international human rights regime by calling attention to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights that states that all people have the inalienable right to self-determination.74 
 
Boundaries and Identity: The Politics of Mapping Gilgit-Baltistan 
 
Pakistan cannot openly include Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan as an undisputed 
national territory as its official position, seconded by the country’s constitution, is that the region 
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is disputed and a UN-led plebiscite will decide its future. However, the irresponsible conciseness 
with which the constitution refers to, ‘such States and territories as are or may be included in 
Pakistan, whether by accession or otherwise,’75 places Gilgit-Baltistan in an ambiguous enough 
position for the country to, “remain in compliance of UN resolutions as well as continue denying 
constitutional rights to the people of the region.”76 The 2020 United Nations official map of the 
world identifies the collective region of Gilgit-Baltistan, Pakistan-controlled Azad Kashmir, and 
Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir, as the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir, as per its 
official stance (Figure 1). 
Strikingly, the contentious region’s political and territorial ambiguity is proven by 
analyzing mapping techniques employed across the sub-continent. The Official Indian Map, 
taken from the Survey of India, shows Gilgit-Baltistan as part of the larger Jammu and Kashmir 
disputed region. (Figure 2). Surprisingly, ignoring the politico-territorial reality, the map does 
not refer to Jammu and Kashmir, Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, as disputed.77 This depicts 
India’s official claim that Kashmir is and has been a fundamental part of the Republic. The lack 
of recognition of Kashmir’s reality in India confounds its international status. 
In contrast, Pakistan terms the Azad Jammu and Kashmir region as ‘disputed’. However, 
after inspecting numerous maps shared by Pakistan’s government, Pakistan’s inability to 
concretize Gilgit Baltistan’s status is noticeable. Throughout history, Pakistan’s maps have 
portrayed different versions of Kashmir and Northern Areas. Drawing on sociologist Nosheen 
Ali’s analysis of Pakistani maps, Pakistan’s perception of disputed Kashmir is rooted in 
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76 Nosheen Ali, Delusional States: Feeling Rule and Development in Pakistan’s Northern 
Frontier, (London: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 44. 
77 Martin Sökefeld, “Jammu and Kashmir – boundaries and movement,” Contemporary South 
Asia 23, no. 3 (2015): 251. 
 
Tariq 
 
 
39 
uncertainty. In the 2012 Survey of Pakistan Map, the region identified as disputed Kashmir is 
just a blanket category labelled, ‘Jammu and Kashmir, Disputed Territory’ (Figure 3). This 
labelled region does not include Aksai Chin, China-occupied Kashmir surrendered to China by 
Pakistan through the 1963 Sino-Pakistan Agreement. The official Indian map encompasses Aksai 
Chin as India maintains that Pakistan was not authorized to cede disputed land. Interestingly, the 
Line of Control that divides Indian-held Kashmir and Pakistan-held Kashmir is absent, as that 
would symbolically map the Indian-held Kashmir and weaken Pakistan’s official claim to the 
entire territory of Kashmir.78 However, the region identified as disputed Kashmir does not 
include parts of present-day Gilgit Baltistan. It is clearly separated from the rest of Jammu and 
Kashmir and not labelled ‘disputed’. An indirect clarification on Gilgit-Baltistan’s official 
political status is presented; the government of Pakistan’s intention to maintain ambiguity is 
portrayed by the colors used to separate regions. Every province is colored differently, but the 
cartographers color present-day Gilgit Baltistan and disputed Jammu and Kashmir with the same 
‘light green’. Although a boundary exists between both regions, “the colors connect but the lines 
divide.”79 Thus, the ‘calculated ambiguity’ towards the region, promotes indecision while 
enforcing deep political control. The official mapping agency of Pakistan does not directly 
categorize Gilgit-Baltistan as disputed.  
The politics of urban planning are exemplified in the varying maps of Gilgit-Baltistan. Its 
liminality is kept intact because its status is disputed internationally. Its disputed status is not 
translated on Pakistan’s official map, thus creating a sense of uncertainty and speculation 
amongst its population and beyond. 
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Conclusion 
“We are peaceful people. We don’t even need money from the Pakistani government. We 
just need recognition. We just need a proper identification,” pleaded Jamil Iqbal, one of my 
interviewees and member of the Gilgit-Baltistani community in New York City who had lived in 
Gilgit for 20 years. He emphasized the neglect and uncertainty his people had encountered for 
centuries that led to frustration spilling in the form of violence.  
Betwixt and in-between, liminality as a legal uncertainty is evident in the region. 
Officially, the region is not a de jure but a de facto part of Pakistan. As Sökefeld explains, Gilgit-
Baltistan is not part of Kashmir but the Kashmir dispute. He notes that the region is held hostage 
by the Kashmir dispute, deferring its accession to Pakistan.80 Reform packages promised more 
representation but maintained the supremacy of the federal government. Rights, short of legal 
and political integration, were extended to calm the masses. It may seem illogical that Gilgit-
Baltistan fights for recognition from a politically unstable and economically disadvantaged 
nation that sustains a state of disillusionment and ambiguity. However, fairly recent memory of 
the struggles of their forefathers against oppressive rule to declare accession to Pakistan 
rationalizes their repeated demand for provincial recognition.  
Nevertheless, it is naïve to substantiate the federal government’s efforts to obscure Gilgit-
Baltistan’s political status by believing in the notion of awaiting a possible plebiscite to resolve 
the dispute. As I argue in the next two chapters, this uncertainty is intentional and fueled by 
opportunistic reasons that manifest the government’s plans to concretize and make permanent the 
region’s legal liminality. 
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FIGURE 1 
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FIGURE 2 
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FIGURE 3 
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In the Dragon’s Shadow: China’s Influence on Gilgit-
Baltistan 
 
Aksai Chin Border Dispute  
For decades prior to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor agreement, Pakistan left no 
stone unturned to appease China; and in return, China secured a neighboring ally against hostile 
India. The Sino-Pakistan Agreement of 1963 was the first, and most significant, milestone in 
Sino-Pak history and solidified the strange bedfellows’ friendship. Simply put, China’s maps 
showed areas of Kashmir in China, leading to much distress in the subcontinent. The Johnson 
Line of 1865 placed Aksai Chin in Kashmir, thus after the Maharaja of Kashmir declared its 
accession to India, the Indian government claimed Aksai Chin. However, the Macartney-
Macdonald Line of 1899 placed Aksai Chin in China.84 Nevertheless, a few years after the 1947 
independence and partition, it was realized that Aksai China was easily accessible to the Chinese, 
who started developing major roads on it, whilst the Indians had to cross the treacherous 
Karakoram to access the region. Nevertheless, Jawaharlal Nehru, the former Prime Minister of 
India, maintained his claim over the region. 
Pakistan, another claimant of Kashmir, voted to grant China a seat in the United Nations, 
leading China to negotiate disputed Aksai China with the Islamic Republic instead. Pakistan 
effectively divided the disputed region of Kashmir and granted China control over Aksai Chin, 
gaining a formidable ally in the region. China, in return, supported Pakistan’s stance on Kashmir, 
tilting the regional axis in favor of Pakistan’s plebiscite solution. The Indian government 
denounced Pakistan for ‘ceding Kashmiri territory to China’. However, Pakistan defended its 
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stance on the basis of the Macartney-Macdonald Line of 1899, instead alleging that China had 
ceded a part of its rightful territory to Pakistan.85 
The accession of Aksai Chin is vital to understand the government of Pakistan’s 
intentions in Gilgit-Baltistan. Pakistan’s inability to grant provisional provincial status to Gilgit-
Baltistan under the pretense of the plebiscite is hypocritical as is substantiated by Article 6 of the 
Sino-Pakistan agreement of 1963: 
 “The two Parties have agreed that after the settlement of the Kashmir dispute between Pakistan 
and India, the sovereign authority concerned will reopen negotiations with the Government of the 
People's Republic of China, on the boundary as described in Article Two of the present 
Agreement, so as to sign a formal Boundary Treaty to replace the present agreement: Provided 
that in the event of that sovereign authority being Pakistan, the provisions of this agreement and 
the aforesaid Protocol shall be maintained in the formal Boundary Treaty to be signed between 
the Peoples Republic of China and Pakistan.”86 
 
Whether this region originally belonged to China or not is beyond the scope of this thesis 
but Pakistan’s readiness to temporarily give China a part of a disputed territory until the Kashmir 
crisis is resolved, proves that Pakistan could grant Gilgit Baltistan’s requests for provisional 
provincial status until the plebiscite is held. Thus, the Sino-Pakistan agreement debases 
Pakistan’s justifications for disenfranchising the people of Gilgit-Baltistan; begging the question: 
Why? In short, the government of Pakistan prioritizes its friendship with China over the rights of 
its own citizens manifested through the hotly debated China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. 
 
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor 
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“Pak-China friendship is higher than the Himalayas, and deeper than the deepest sea in 
the world and sweeter than honey,” said former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to Premier of the 
People’s Republic of China Li Keqiang on Sharif’s first diplomatic visit to a foreign country 
after his win in the 2013 national elections.87  This point was the culmination of China-Pakistan 
relationships and the start of a ginormous infrastructure project that changed the fate of Gilgit-
Baltistan and demonstrated its crippling authority over its own territory. 
Gilgit-Baltistan provides Pakistan an extended border with China. China’s One Belt and 
One Road initiative, commonly referred to as the Belt Road Initiative or BRI, builds and funds 
construction projects spearheaded by China globally. In 2015, President Xi Jinping and former 
Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif signed a momentous agreement, later termed China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor, commonly referred to as CPEC, promising $62 billion investment 
and infrastructural projects in Pakistan. The corridor would connect the Chinese northern 
province of Xinjiang with the deep-sea Pakistani port of Gwadar to cut China’s maritime 
distance and offer the country another strategic port in the Arabian sea.88 The Chinese 
government has made ambitious promises to build modern transportation networks to connect 
Karachi and Gwadar, Karachi and Lahore, and Karachi and Peshawar. All projects are scheduled 
to be completed by 2050. The official website of the Corridor describes it as, “the enhancement 
of geographical linkages having improved road, rail, and air transportation system with frequent 
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and free exchanges of growth and people to people contact, enhancing understanding through 
academic, cultural and regional knowledge and culture.”89 
 
China and Pakistan: An analysis of CPEC’s socio-economic impact on the country 
 
Pakistan considered this deal with the Chinese government the lifeboat it needed to save 
its drowning economy. Nevertheless, it is essential to breakdown China’s economic investment 
in Pakistan to recognize the real beneficiaries of this corridor. CPEC is funded through direct 
investment, soft loans, and commercial deposits. Although widescale CPEC-initiated 
infrastructural development in Pakistan is expected to generate profit in the long-run, Pakistan 
has suffered tremendously under the load of unsustainable dependence on Chinese loans. 
CPEC has contributed to an elevation of Pakistan’s external debt. Pakistan owns $6.7 
billion in commercial loans to China by June 2022.90 Pakistan’s total external debt and liabilities 
increased by $31.6 billion between Fiscal Year 2015 and Fiscal Year 2018 to $96.7 billion, due 
to higher borrowing from China to finance the fiscal deficit.91 However, considering the current 
situation, Pakistan cannot even pay a fraction of that money by the set due date. Pakistan’s 
enthusiastic borrowing from its eager neighbor led Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan to 
borrow $6 billion from the IMF in 2019, making this Pakistan 13th IMF loan. Although the 
CPEC loan is 6% of Pakistan’s total external debt and liabilities, it does not indicate that 
Pakistan can return the money by the contractual deadlines.92 
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China-Pakistan Economic Corridor has also contributed to a sense of inferiority amongst 
Pakistanis. Firstly, Pakistan’s hyper-religious establishment has turned a blind eye to the 
persecution of Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang. Beijing has initiated a crackdown that includes 
imprisoning at least 120,000 in re-education camps.93 And yet, Pakistani officialdom, because of 
the importance of its partnership with Beijing, has ignored these abuses. Prime Minister Imran 
Khan dodged a question on this topic during an interview with the Financial Times, claiming he 
“did not know much about it”.94 The more that China continues to abuse its Muslims even as it 
casts a wider shadow over Pakistan, the greater the likelihood that Pakistan’s influential Islamists 
and their many supporters will turn on China; call out Beijing for its treatment of Muslims; and 
lambast the Pakistan-China partnership as a blasphemous bond.   
The second reason why China’s influence is problematic for Pakistani society and culture 
is that its nationals in Pakistan—who are coming to the country in increasingly large numbers—
enjoy an environment of impunity. This impunity has enabled appalling and unpunished 
behavior that has included attacks on local security forces, marriage scams, and the neglect of 
already-marginalized populations in Gilgit-Baltistan, the foundation of CPEC. 
Chinese engineers, working on CPEC projects, have attacked local police in the city of 
Khanewal after being told they could not leave their housing complexes without security 
personnel. The Chinese engineers cut power supplies to the police camp in a local construction 
site, and they abandoned their heavy machinery on main roads in protest. However, no legal 
action was taken against the instigators. Instead, six policemen were suspended because they had 
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not “restrained” themselves.95 However, it is also important to note that Chinese workers in 
Pakistan have been targeted by terrorists which had led to increasing securitization and 
militarization of Gilgit-Baltistan. Nevertheless, Chinese citizens get a free pass in Pakistan. 
Thousands of impoverished women in Pakistan have been the target of predatory 
marriage scams run by Chinese migrants. These brides are promised a better standard of living 
but are instead trafficked to China and forced into prostitution. Numerous reports indicate that 
Chinese businessmen have married local Pakistani women and taken them to China to force them 
into prostitution. According to a report from July 2019, 200 women, who are the wives of men 
from Gilgit Baltistan, have been locked away in the so-called ‘education centers’ run by China in 
Xinjiang province.96 Not surprisingly, the Chinese migrant ringleaders of these trafficking scams 
are not held accountable. 
From a geopolitical standpoint, India’s relation with its least favorite neighbor has soured 
with the advent of this multinational project. Both countries have fought three wars over the 
disputed territory of Kashmir where CPEC is rooted. New Delhi expressed anger at China’s 
construction in Gilgit-Baltistan, calling it a breach of sovereignty and the United Nations 
resolution. China, in fear of international sanctions, has pushed Pakistan to grant Gilgit-Baltistan 
provincial status so that it loses its disputed status. However, despite Pakistan’s refusal to 
 
94 Ben Westcott, “Pakistan’s Khan dodges questions on mass Chinese detention of Muslims,” 
CNN World, March 29, 2019, https://edition.cnn.com/2019/03/28/asia/imran-khan-china-uyghur-
intl/index.html. 
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recognize Gilgit-Baltistan as a rightful part of its territory, China has continued to use the 
Karakoram Highway.  
 
China and Gilgit-Baltistan: False Promises 
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, amongst unprecedented economic and regional-
relationship dilemmas, has also failed to fulfill its promise of revamping Gilgit-Baltistan. The 
‘lifeline’ of CPEC, the Karakorum highway that connects China to Pakistan, passes through 
Gilgit-Baltistan. Gilgit-Baltistan was promised employment, improved educational opportunities, 
a booming industry, and a stronger relationship with the federal government. Instead, the 
developmental impacts of infrastructural projects on Gilgit-Baltistan’s indigenous community 
has led people to question the success of this much-hyped initiative. 
Although Gilgit-Baltistan quite literally provides China with a direct pipeline into 
Pakistan, Gilgit-Baltistan itself is not gaining from the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and 
has never gained from the China-Pakistan friendship. The government of Pakistan acquired lands 
of local farmers in 2012 during the realignment of the Karakoram Highway that connects both 
countries. Thousands of landowners were displaced and were never fully compensated for an 
unexplained breach of their human rights.97 Thus, alarms raised amongst the local population 
when the China-Pakistan corridor was announced. Without the Karakoram highway, the corridor 
would cease to exist. Thus, the residents of Gilgit-Baltistan were promised employment, 
industry, and a complete reconstruction of the neglected state. However, since its inception in 
2014, CPEC has not led to a single dollar of investment in Gilgit-Baltistan, according to Taj 
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Haider, head of the Senate’s special committee on CPEC from 2015-2018. Locals complained of 
CPEC’s focus on Punjab, the largest province by size and population in Pakistan, and Gwadar, 
the deep-sea port referred to as the “gateway to Asia”, instead of GB which allows China to 
access Pakistan by land. Gilgit Baltistan’s role has been severely limited. Except for providing 
services of the road and some security-related assurances, GB has been largely excluded from 
the infrastructural makeover of the country.98 The government has highlighted different mega-
structural projects scheduled to begin in Gilgit-Baltistan, but none have begun as of yet. The 
voraciously promoted Gilgit Karakoram International University Hydropower project, which 
would provide 100MW of energy to the deprived state, has been “under review of experts from 
both sides” since early 2018.99 Additionally, even if the proposed projects begin, Gilgit-
Baltistanis fear the potential ecological, financial, and social harm to its residents. The locals 
indeed want to reap the benefits of CPEC but the analyses on potential repercussions of 
international development in a disputed territory and a noticeable lack of governmental concern 
have left many in the region worried. 
Firstly, the Awami Action Committee (AAC), an alliance of political groups from GB, 
demanded GB be included as a third party in the CPEC agreement.100 However, GB was not 
included as a stakeholder and this deal was signed without the consultation of its peoples. 
Developmental consultant Izhar Hunzai, who researched the potential long-term impacts of 
CPEC, shared in a statement from 2016 that CPEC is a ‘black hole’ for the locals. “The 
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government has not engaged with us; we do not know exactly how much or what Gilgit-
Baltistan’s role will be in CPEC or how we will benefit from it,” expressed Hunzai.101 
Secondly, the government of Pakistan promoted the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor 
as the solution to rampant unemployment and underemployment in the underdeveloped region. 
However, China invited its local labor to work on all Chinese-funded infrastructural projects 
instead. Islamabad claimed that CPEC construction in Gilgit-Baltistan will create 1.8 million 
jobs in the region and sustain the region long-term, but China has planned to bring 400,000 of its 
own labor to the region.102 Political analysts from the region were, unsurprisingly, doubtful of 
Pakistan’s promises. Amir Hussain, a political analyst from the region, blamed CPEC for 
destroying the livelihood of the few employed locals. “The Chinese bring their own manpower 
wherever they go. For CPEC, around 400,000 of them will be working in Gilgit-Baltistan. How 
will the locals get jobs?" Hussain questioned.103 Additionally, the government revoked the 
licenses for local miners and handed all mining in the region to Chinese developers. Cheap 
Chinese goods have already flooded local markets of the north and surpassed the regional 
industry. Furthermore, China’s massive infrastructural projects are solely benefitting the federal 
government of Pakistan rather than the crumbling industry of Gilgit Baltistan. Yoana Barakova, 
a research analyst at European Foundation for South Asian Studies, expressed concern at the 
Pakistani government’s promise of distributing profits amongst the locals. “The region is 
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completely excluded from high financial profits,” said Barakov.104 the timely decision to charge 
a fee on vehicles using the highway. Moreover, the road toll charged to Chinese trucks entering 
GB through Karakoram Highway is distributed amongst the federal government of Pakistan and 
the Chinese officials managing CPEC. 
Thirdly, as mentioned before, China’s economic intervention was bound to be a point of 
contention between Pakistan and India, a claimant of the region. India fervently opposed China’s 
infrastructural projects in the region it deems Pakistani-occupied Kashmir. In July 2018, the 
Union Defense Ministry of India described CPEC as a challenge to Indian sovereignty. However, 
this is not the sole reason why India refuses to partake or support Chinese development in 
Pakistan.  
The Indian government realized the massive scale of the Belt and Road Initiative would 
increase China’s regional and global power. China’s partnership in Pakistan gives Pakistan a 
strong ally in the region against India. Additionally, not only are the economic fruits of the 
corridor-led industry suspected to be reaped by the federal government, locals’ livelihood is 
projected to be severely impacted. It is feared that over the coming years, locals will be displaced 
to make space for Chinese settlements.105 According to certain news outlets, thousands have 
been displaced already.106 Moreover, China’s offer to build the controversial Bhasha Dam, a 
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long-debated project stagnant for decades, has led to the land confiscation and subsequently 
displaced thousands without any compensation.107 
Beyond severe economic issues lie disastrous ecological problems. Pakistan is highly 
vulnerable to climate change. Pakistan ranked 8th in the countries most affected by climate 
change from 1998-2017 according to the Global Climate Risk Index 2019.108 Major 
infrastructural development leads to a sharp increase in air pollution in an already smog-covered 
country. Gilgit Baltistan is especially vulnerable to climate change. Gilgit-Baltistan is at the 
confluence of three major mountain ranges: Karakoram, Himalayas, and the Hindu Kush. From 
alpine meadows to snowcapped glaciers, the region hosts a wide variety of unique flora and 
fauna. The recent surge in global warming intensified snow-melting and glacial recession.  
Until 1978, the region was cut-off from the rest of the world and was only accessible by 
dilapidated roads and steep hiking trails. 1978 saw the commencement of the Karakorum 
Highway that was created with the sole purpose of providing a trade route with China. Thus, the 
social inclusion of Gilgit-Baltistanis was largely ignored for decades until Pakistan decided to 
establish a land route with its neighbor. The road enabled locals to travel back and forth and 
engage in other industries than agriculture. However, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor has 
negatively impacted the serenity of the region. A heavy influx of traffic and tourism from China 
on the Karakoram Highway causes air and noise pollution. Air pollution can stress sensitive 
high-altitude regions and affect the growth of mountainous forests that protect the region against 
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avalanches, soil erosion, and landslides.109 Emission of harmful gasses from traffic can cause 
serious health problems in the locals living in proximity to the Karakoram Highway. Emission 
from cars is amplified in Gilgit-Baltistan because the traffic moves uphill, thus using more 
energy and releasing more harmful gases. Locals have spoken out against the lack of planning by 
the federal government to address the environmental concerns that stem from a national project 
that takes more than it gives to the most affected area of Gilgit-Baltistan.  
Amidst this chaos, another force now harms the debilitated northern region of Pakistan: 
Coronavirus. 333 people (at the time of writing) have been diagnosed with coronavirus in Gilgit-
Baltistan, not far behind the significantly larger provinces of Punjab and Sindh.110 Chinese 
engineers remained under lockdown for an additional 4 weeks in Wuhan and other provinces of 
China when they returned for New Year’s Celebration.111 However, realizing the time-sensitive 
development in various parts of Pakistan, most were sent back to continue work on projects. 
Although Pakistan’s government claims that before traveling on special planes to return to 
Pakistan, Chinese engineers and workers were quarantined in their home countries, the 
government’s decision seems rushed. Major regions of China were closed for months on end but 
when it came to continuing time-sensitive projects in Pakistan, China immediately returned the 
labor and Pakistan readily accepted it. Minister of Pakistan Railways Sheikh Rashid Ahmed said, 
“Coronavirus would never affect the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the Main 
Line (ML-1) project would continue according to the schedule.”112  
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Khunjerab Pass, the gateway to the world, through which Karakoram Highway runs, is 
closed annually from November to March, the snowiest months of the year. An extension of its 
closure was expected due to the violent spread of the disease in Gilgit-Baltistan. However, 
Pakistan opened the gates of Khunjerab Pass on March 28 to allow passage of trucks filled with 
necessary medical equipment to enter the already drained country.113 Numerous NGOs and 
political activists opposed this short-sighted decision to open the border. In response, Pakistan’s 
government has highlighted that not only is Xinjiang the least impacted of all provinces in China, 
but also the Karakorum highway sustains thousands of families in Gilgit-Baltistan. Pakistan’s 
government fails to understand is that the problem is not China but opening borders at a time 
when the health infrastructure of the region is already burdened. Dr. Misfar Hasan, a political 
activist from Pakistan, highlighted, “there are only a few ventilators and no trained doctors who 
can manage the seriously ill (in Gilgit Baltistan)."114 The region is ill-equipped to tackle the 
pandemic and the socio-economic and ecological impacts of continuing trade in these dark times 
will further debilitate the region and its population.  
 
Conclusion 
Jamil Iqbal, a prominent middle-aged member of the diaspora Gilgit Baltistan community 
in New York, who I’ve quoted briefly before, frowned when I asked his thoughts on the China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor. Standing amongst tens of his community members, he exclaimed, 
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“The Corridor’s royalties do not belong to us! They go through our province, but the federal 
government collects the toll. Gilgit-Baltistan has never benefitted from CPEC!” 
 China realized the enormous geostrategic relevance of the region and decided to profit 
off of it. The locals were left in the dark while the central government of China and Pakistan 
planned to revamp the region. Gilgit-Baltistan was not even consulted when the China-Pakistan 
Economic Corridor was officially agreed upon. “An atmosphere of secrecy and confusion 
regarding the whole CPEC project,” writes Director of South Asia Democratic Forum Siegfried 
Wolf, surrounded the region.115 Most importantly, Gilgit Baltistan is not even benefitting from 
the multi-billion-dollar project. Locals were promised employment opportunities, tourism, and 
more representation. Instead, most CPEC projects are concentrated in the wealthy province of 
Punjab. In the immediate aftermath of the start of CPEC, locals experienced massive 
unemployment due to competition with cheaper Chinese goods. The government, furthermore, 
canceled the licenses of local miners and handed mining to the Chinese workers. Most 
shockingly, all major construction contracts go either to Chinese firms or Pakistani military-
owned companies (MILBUS) at the expense of local entrepreneurs and work force. Pakistan has 
increased its military presence in Gilgit Baltistan to protect Chinese businessmen. The residents 
of Gilgit-Baltistan have long-needed security from sectarian violence and terrorism, but Pakistan 
extended this resource once the Chinese businessmen arrived.  
China’s unaccountable actions in Gilgit Baltistan and beyond further emphasize the 
liminality of the region as the locals do not have the constitutional right to take up their 
complaints to the Supreme Court. Gilgit-Baltistan is now expected to bear the brunt of 
coronavirus without sufficient help from the federal government. Its constitutional ambiguity and 
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political liminality are manifested through the federal government’s refusal to fulfill demands for 
increase testing in hospitals and immediate cash-assistance for locals.116 As anthropologist 
Shafqat Hussain notes, ‘the continued failure of the Pakistani state to respond positively to the 
political demands of the people of the [Gilgit-Baltistan] has spawned an atmosphere of 
disenchantment and disdain’.117 The liminality of the region is apparent when it comes to the 
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor; unrestricted access to a foreign nation without approval 
from the local community while falsely promising increased employment and development. The 
Chinese workers do not have to share profits or be concerned with Gilgit-Baltistan’s local 
population as it is not an official part of Pakistan. Consequently, it can be argued that Pakistan 
maintains GB’s liminality to authorize unrestricted access to the region for financial gain and to 
sustain mutually beneficial relations with China.  
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Abrogation of Article 370 and the Concretization of 
Liminality in Gilgit-Baltistan 
 
 
Pakistan’s justification for maintaining a stronghold over Gilgit-Baltistan fell through on 
August 5, 2019, when India abrogated Article 370 and scrapped Artilce 35A from the Indian 
constitution, effectively annexing Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir. Article 35A empowered 
Jammu and Kashmir’s legislature to grant special privileges to ‘permanent residents’ of Kashmir 
— such as purchasing land, contesting local elections, availing state benefits — that non-
permanent residents were not entitled to.118 Article 370 excepted Indian-held Jammu and 
Kashmir from the Indian constitution and allowed the local legislature to make its own laws in 
all matters except foreign affairs, defense, finance, and communications.119120 Prime Minister 
Narender Modi had promised in his manifesto that he would take this unpopular step, and to 
India and the global community’s surprise, he actually did. 
However, this action cannot be attributed to the freewill of a sovereign state. The third 
perambulatory clause of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 47 of 1948 requests 
both governments to, “create proper conditions for a free and impartial plebiscite to decide 
whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir is to accede to Pakistan or not.”121 In addition, Article 
1 (ii) of the Simla Agreement signed between Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan in 1972 to 
bilaterally solve the Kashmir issue clearly states: 
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“That the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral 
negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them. Pending the 
final settlement of any of the problems between the two countries, neither side shall unilaterally 
alter the situation and both shall prevent the organization, assistance or encouragement of any 
acts detrimental to the maintenance of peaceful and harmonious relations.”122 
 
The abrogation of Article 370 and 35A not only violate international and bilateral 
treaties, but India’s own constitution. Dr. Abhinav Chandrachud, an advocate at Bombay High 
Court, declared this accession unconstitutional. He highlights that the basis of Jammu and 
Kashmir’s accession to India in October 1947 was that India would not exceed its boundaries 
without the consent of the people of Jammu and Kashmir through their elected representatives.123 
By not consulting the elected representatives of the region before taking this decision, India has 
effectively violated the constitution. Chandrachud notes that the Indian government failed to take 
into account the opinions of the legislative assembly of the state on converting Jammu and 
Kashmir into a union territory, violating Article 3 of the Indian constitution.124 
India’s definitive, and illegal, move to annex Jammu and Kashmir, against the wishes of 
its residents, speaks volumes to the democratic deficit of the country. However, it also speaks 
volumes to the government of Pakistan’s incompetency in exercising a similar resolution for 
Gilgit-Baltistan, a region that has been awaiting recognition from the Pakistani government for 
seven decades. Pakistan’s establishment, as was expected, opposed India’s actions, creating a 
looming threat of nuclear war across the region. Azad Kashmir stood by Pakistan as the country 
sought international support to defy India’s actions. However, although politicians in Gilgit-
Baltistan disputed this move, an air of uncertainty blanketed the region. Pakistan expressed 
dissatisfaction at India’s wrongful actions, but this anger seemed misplaced, misdirected, and 
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somewhat hypocritical.125 Gilgit-Baltistan, a supposed part of Kashmir, has pleaded for 
recognition to no avail whereas the Pakistani government expressed sympathy for Indian 
Muslims in recently annexed Jammu and Kashmir.  
The government of Pakistan, as has been detailed in previous chapters, has time and 
again justified its unrepresentative policies in Gilgit-Baltistan by emphasizing the sanctity of the 
UN resolution and India’s upholding of all treaties concerning Kashmir. However, since the 
abrogation of Article 370, the UN resolution and the Simla Agreement are essentially defunct. 
Pakistan could grant Gilgit-Baltistan provincial status immediately now that India has done the 
same. However, its decision to maintain the status quo manifests Pakistan’s intentions of keeping 
the region in permanent limbo. It is important to note that such a move will invite opposition 
from the Indian government, Indian-held Kashmir, and Pakistan-held Kashmir, but that did not 
deter India from officially integrating Jammu and Kashmir. Although Pakistan’s basis of 
maintaining the liminal status of Gilgit-Baltistan fell through, Gilgit-Baltistan is still stuck in 
ambiguity. However, this time, its liminality is likely permanent.  
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Conclusion 
 
Permanently attached to the Kashmir issue for the federal government’s benefit, Gilgit-
Baltistan has suffered long enough as the most vulnerable region of Pakistan. Disillusionment 
and desperation for national identity creates an identity vacuum occupied by increasing religious 
identification manifested through sectarian violence. Resistance movements are shot down by the 
police and political activists are imprisoned. Contracted Chinese development is concentrated in 
all other regions except the most underdeveloped one. Uncertainty looms in the region as India 
includes Gilgit-Baltistan in its official maps. Devolution of power is a façade to temporarily 
pacify the disgruntled locals. There is not a structured place it came from and not a structured 
place that it awaits. Thus, its liminality is permanent, its wait for recognition endless. 
“They occupy a liminal and interstitial space in the international legal and political order, an order 
that remains founded upon and grounded in the interests of sovereign nation states rather than in 
the claims of sub- or transnational actors, whether individuals or groups.”126 
 
Laurie-King Irani, associate professor of Anthropology at Georgetown University, 
similarly describes the statelessness of Palestinians living under occupation, an unrecognizable 
part of a recognizable whole. Gilgit-Baltistan’s struggle for recognition has not received 
comparable coverage, despite previous verbal interventions by the United Nations and the 
European Parliament. Its historical exploitation by the British, Indians, and China, due to its 
highly strategical position, shows it has been anomalous for centuries. Time will not tell what is 
to be done in the region. Time has already told the government’s intentions of maintaining the 
unpopular status quo. However, it remains to be seen if India takes additional steps to officially 
annex Pakistan-held Kashmir. There also might be a possibility that Pakistan loosens its control 
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over the region while sustaining its liminality. Nevertheless, its liminality is entrenched and only 
challengeable under miraculous circumstances. 
Permanently settled in the in-between territories have been seldom discussed in the 
disciplines of political geography and international studies. The creation and manipulation of 
boundaries by human governments is not only a result of specific socio-cultural regional policies 
or unique spatial structures, but it is an international phenomenon in all aspects. Permanent 
liminality transcends across boundaries, political processes, and culture. Consequently, the 
excruciating experience of prolonged political ambiguity is not only common to Gilgit-Baltistan 
or the West Bank. Although tax-paying US citizens, Puerto Ricans cannot vote in presidential 
elections and have no voting power in the US Congress. In the 2012 plebiscite, the locals chose 
statehood, but the complex web of bureaucracy killed this democratic decision. Hence, Puerto 
Ricans live a political paradox that concretizes their liminality. Kurds in the Middle East have 
fought tirelessly for a homeland — Kurdistan — but have never obtained a permanent nation 
state, instead trapped in the bordering countries of Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Armenia. 
Additionally, the State of Somaliland is a self-declared democratic country but remains 
ambiguous as it is not recognized by any country or international organization; thus, it survives 
at the margins of global political processes. 
Although varying in scope, the previous examples, amongst numerous others, emphasize 
the commonness of political permanent uncertainty. Instead of individualizing and separating 
these cases, a sub-field of permanent liminality in urban and international studies begs 
origination. Once permanently liminal zones are analyzed collectively, possible policy 
recommendations and global solutions can be brainstormed and implemented to address this 
seldom researched global security, social, economic, and cultural dilemma. 
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